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Within the EU, there is currently an explicit struggle to articulate and render coherent a range of policies, narratives, definitions and processes for governing migration, and in particular for the insertion of new governing logics and relationships under the heading of ‘new immigration policy’. The struggle to assert a coherent governance regime in the field of migration involves combining and re-combining different policy narratives, institutional assumptions and relationships within the EU, and between EU and member states. In this article we identify and evaluate the key, often contradictory narratives, mediated among the institutions and broader dynamics of EU policymaking: (human) rights, security, economic needs, and social integration. These discourses interact to construct a new, identifiable policy terrain, of European migration governance,  







In this article we examine what governance complexity means in practice and how policy complexity is ‘governed’ by the discursive imposition of ‘coherence’ – in one of the most complex policymaking examples currently available to us. Our primary focus is on the emergence of legal migration as a relatively new field of governance in the EU, which from 1999 expanded the range and diversity of concerns (assembled within and across policy narratives) legitimately considered part of the remit of the EU as a policymaking body. 

Drawing on earlier work developed in a different context (Carmel and Harlock 2008), we argue that EU migration governance involves ongoing contestation and struggle over the field of ‘migration’, in order to institute a governable terrain, identifiable as EU migration policy. This policy field is dynamic and unstable, but we argue that an identifiable migration policy is being ‘assembled’ (Newman and Clarke 2009) from a rather diverse and contradictory set of policy orientations and interests which intersect with, and inflect one another. Our approach draws on the insights of those who cite the importance of discursive work in policymaking (e.g.  Yanow 1996, 2000) to explore how tensions between and within four major discourses relating to migration are dealt with and organised in the construction of EU migration governance. Unusually for policy-making, this struggle for coherence has even become an explicit figure in EU discourse figuring in many documents and now being used as a tool to engage and negotiate with other actors. With Yanow, the struggle for coherence can be interpreted as the continuous attempt to make sense of conflicting policy meanings and competing claims.

The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we establish how the terminology of assemblage can draw attention to the way in which various and partly contradictory policy orientations are connected in flexible and often unexpected frameworks of sense-making, and how actors, processes and practices intersect in the production of a ‘coherent’ migration policy in the EU. Section three provides a summary ‘potted history’ of recent migration policy developments before going on to examine the four interrelated narratives attached to EU migration governance, their ambiguities, layered interpretations, interrelationships and internal and external tensions. In a document analysis of all EU communications, directives and proposal published on migration since the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 we detected the following policy discourses: rights and equality; securities and risks; economic needs; and social integration. These orientations are used to address, or even create, different categories of migrant status, different categories of ‘Europe’ and different statuses of member states. We will show how broad discourses conceal often conflicting policy narratives which may be contradictory . Yet, as tensions remain, there is a persistent struggle to define and delimit a coherent EU migration governance. The attempt to assemble multiple policy narratives in one framework of sense-making, most recently characterised as a singular ‘EU migration policy’, is thus continuously in progress.


2. Assembling institutional complexity in EU migration policy
In this article, we liberally adopt (and probably adapt) the terms ‘assemblages’ and ‘to assemble’ from Newman and Clarke (2009) in order to interpret how the Union in all its complexity has to date constructed and attempted to institutionalise a governable terrain which can be recognised and acted on as ‘EU migration governance’. We endorse their assessment that processes of governing involve work; the making and doing of politics in order to produce governing processes. Most importantly for us, reference to assemblage draws attention to the constructed, but not necessarily coherent, character of governance (ibid: 9). For us, the struggle for coherence thus requires an analysis of the discourses which sustain and make sense of governing practices, and how the narratives subsumed in these  general discourses help to organise various elements of EU migration governance. Before examining the discourses and their competing narratives in detail, we need to address the ways in which complexity of governance is institutionally manifested in our case, taking account of its EU-ness and its migration focus. 

First, the case of the EU. Our study views EU governance as the object of analysis: we seek to explain how EU governance is practiced as a whole – i.e. viewing the Union as an entity which comprises numerous institutions, committees, networks, formally and informally recognised which also extend beyond the EU, to form a ‘complex strategic field’ Kostakopoulou (2000: 500) where there “exist several and distinct sites of power, […] the density of their interconnections means that each of them cannot be studied in isolation from the rest.”

In addition to the inherent complexity of governing in the EU, additional complications arise from the case of migration. Migration and immigration policies are, even within national states, subject to highly conflicting tendencies, and involve a multitude of actors and can engage numerous political perspectives (Sciortino 2000) such as international trade, development, labour market policies etc. Thus migration is a matter of international law, but also of inter-state relations: historical relationships between countries of origin and destination, and relationships with neighbouring countries matter. It primarily involves ministries of the interior, but can concern numerous other agencies, and therefore conflicting political, professional and personal orientations and realms of activity (Crowley 2001). Here we concentrate on three sets of relationship which are significant, all of which contribute to the complexity of EU migration governance. 

Member states, law, and the ECJ.  Member states have more extensive governing authority in all policy areas than the quasi-federated, supranational authority. This is the case even where EU law takes precedence over member state law. This is because, even in so-called hard law in the acquis communautaire, sanctions for non-compliance are limited, and the distinction between federated EU law and soft law recommendations is not as clear as might be assumed (Falkner 2005) In addition, different member states with different histories, and different degrees of authority within the EU are differentially subordinated to the acquis. More recently acceded states have differential access to apparently fundamental rights of the Union, notably free movement (e.g. Kvist 2004; for detailed discussion see Carmel and Paul 2009), while the terms of absorption, application and ‘translation’ of the acquis for more recent members are notably different from those applied to older members (Lendvai 2008). Furthermore, as Kostakopoulou (2000) outlines, unlike within member states, policies and laws affecting migrants in the EU are unevenly applicable as the most obvious example of opt-ins and opt-outs of Schengen highlights. Kostakopoulou further argues that the restrictions placed by member states on how ECJ rulings can be used in relation to the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice means that the acquis on migration will also be unevenly applied, without easy recourse to European-wide judgements. 

Member states, the Council and the Commission​[1]​. In migration policy, there is much agreement that the Commission has tried to push a more economically and rights-based ‘liberal’ orientation, which has been persistently resisted by a security-oriented Council, protecting its sovereignty over border control policy and institutions (Uçarer 2009; Niemann 2008; Groenendijk 2005). We view this argument as partial. First it rests on too simple a distinction between rights and security (Sasse 2005). In addition Guiraudon (2000, 2003) argued convincingly that member states have delegated important aspects of ‘security’ control to networks of professionals (police, customs officers), who are both national administrators, but also, in this context, European policy-makers. It seems that member states are less protective of sovereignty than we might assume. In addition, the emergence of ethno-nationalist, xenophobic and racist parties as a normal, and even significant feature of the political landscape (cf  Schierup, Hansen et al. 2006: 3-10), provoked unexpected policy reactions. For example, the EU’s anti-discrimination Directive was finally agreed by the Council only in a context of an explicitly racist party being elected to national government in Austria; serving as a symbolic demonstration of liberal democratic credentials by the Council. 

Representations Migration policy in the EU is not subject to co-decision, which means that the elected body of the Union has few rights over policymaking. In addition, the multi-faceted form of the field of migration policy means that political forces are not aligned in the Union in any straightforward way. Thus interest representations for the rights and social integration of migrants have been active in the EU for some time, but with little impact - at least until recently (Uçarer 2009; Geddes  2000). The representation of socio-economic interests is dispersed and fragmented: European liberal international trading interests of capital are well-represented in Europe (notably through the European Round Table of Industrialists), but in migration policy, the requirements, attitudes and responses of particular kinds of capital to specific migration measures are shaped by sector, type and form of trade (Menz 2009). In addition, however, there is marked divergence of interest between member states, due to the interaction of EU law regarding free movement; national labour market structures and regulations; and national migration laws. Furthermore, the priority given to Community law on the single market has favoured some employers over others, and has strongly ambivalent results, even within a single member state, for workers from different countries of origin working in different sectors or at different skill levels, whether they are EU citizens or Third Country Nationals (Carmel and Paul 2009; Triandafyllidou, Gropas et al. 2007). This makes interest representation regarding migrants and migrant workers in the ‘single market’ both singularly important and markedly difficult (Papadopoulos and Roumpakis 2009).


3. Assembling EU migration governance within and across policy narratives
Before detecting the main policy narratives and their underpinning agendas we wish to provide a brief reference guide to history of the formal markers in policies which address issues of migration policy in the EU. The Schengen Agreement (1985) is widely seen as the first legal outcome of the Treaty of Rome’s free movement agenda for EC workers, but rather critically for our argument, it was not possible to gain agreement to apply this to all member states. Despite the centrality of the tenet of free movement to the founding concept of the EEC/EC/Union, endorsement and practice of this has been uneven, limited, and philosophically incoherent as evidenced by the variable treatment of acceding member states from 1980s onwards (Guillen and Palier 2004). Interest in migration issues gathered pace during the 1990s – the Maastricht Treaty guaranteeing rights of free movement for EU citizen-workers, and velvet revolutions, collapse of the former Soviet Union and the wars in Yugoslavia contributing to substantial increases in inward migration to EU member states. 

In 1997 the Amsterdam Treaty was agreed (in effect from 1999) which partially communitised some aspects of migration policy subject to a transition period. After 2005, the Commission had the sole right of initiative in this field. After an initial flurry of activity in 2000-03, only some of which produced draft Directives, from 2005 onwards we can see that the Commission began to gather together the range of orientations, approaches and concerns in the field of migration to both be able to act coherently, and to order and organise its activities in comprehensible ways among the various Directorates affected. Indeed by 2008, the Commission was even calling explicitly for a ‘coherent immigration policy’ (CEC 2008b), also justified against poor quality output from the Council’s ‘Hague programme’ (CEC 2008a). Nonetheless, the Tampere (1999) and later the Hague (2004) European Councils set significant parameters for the development of migration policy. Tampere interpreted migration primarily in terms of entry control but also provided the impetus to regulating and improving the status of legally resident third county nationals in the so-calles Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. But with the Hague Programme, new orientations to social integration and especially the management and generation of particular forms of economic growth in terms of the Unions Lisbon Agenda were introduced into migration policy.

The rights and equality discourse
There is in the literature a rather liberal use of the term human rights or rights agenda capture some aspects of migration policy. We have identified three rather different narratives attached to an overall rights discourse: limited rights expansion, conditional protection, and rights reduction. They have been used and combined by different actors to extend, but also adjust and contain, the rights and status of migrants in the EU in several ways.

First, in terms of a limited rights expansion, the human rights agenda is widely considered a driver for what the EU has dubbed fair and equal treatment. The adoption of family reunion rights for legally resident third country nationals (TCNs) in 2003 (CEU 2003b) and the Directive on the rights of residence for long-term resident TCNs (LTR-TCNs) (CEU 2003a) have – intentionally as part of the Amsterdam mandate –  created a denizenship status to secure residence rights for TCNs in the absence of viable or desirable naturalisation regimes (Peers 2001). However, this rights expansion also follows limited interpretations of the equal treatment and anti-discrimination directives adopted in 2000 (CEU 2000a; 2000b) both of which did not establish an explicit ‘human rights’ status in EU law. In fact, more recently an additional directive had to be adopted in order to protect the rights of refugees, some of whose rights had been relinquished with the family reunion directive. Despite their origins in anti-discrimination, what is at stake here is more ‘fair treatment’, than ‘equal treatment’, and certainly not the inscription of ‘rights’ comparable to those of EU citizens. This is true also for LTR-TCNs who might have gained formal rights and access to secure long-term residence but who still have to meet conditions of status application set – and often limited – by member states. In this context, Uçarer (2009) argues convincingly that the rights expansion interpretation of the initial Commission proposal for LTRs became subject to the logic of security due to the resistance of specific member states, even though the Council had pursued equal treatment at Tampere as well (see also Kostakopoulou 2002). In terms of a struggle for coherence, we can explain this competing policy interpretation within the rights discourse as follows: in attempting to fix the boundary between legality/illegality, and between migrants who are in/out of Europe, the Council decided to adopt a limited fair treatment and rights expansion agenda. This would identify who could count as ‘legitimate’, desirable migrants and thus be subsumed under the rights agenda, but leave control over ‘illegal’ and unwanted migrants within the realm of MS regulation.

Conditional protection as a second narrative in the equality/rights discourse is evident in the treatment of victims of trafficking, implying attempts to assemble policies from a range of perspectives and practices. Trafficking of human beings was treated in the 1990s as a criminal question driven by the need to police the perpetrators (related to sex industry in particular). It was indeed an archetypical case of Guiraudon’s (2000) ‘venue-shopping’ – constructed as a cross-border policing issue, dealt with by networks of professionals largely outside formal political negotiations. However, there was a contradiction with the desire to punish illegally resident migrants: how can one punish the forcibly moved? This aspect somehow had to be included into the wider fair and equal treatment focus of the EU in order to secure a more coherent policy narrative. What has thus been enforced is the vision of human rights concerned with protection, rather than fairness or equality. At the same time, the Directive which protects victims of trafficking from expulsion also requires their ‘co-operation’ and assistance in criminal investigations of traffickers. Given the especially vulnerable position of such migrants, it seems that the protection to be offered is not rights-based, but highly conditional. In this however, the attempt to cohere different orientations into a migration policy (rather than treating it as part of criminal justice policy) results in the generation of considerable ambiguity concerning the legality/illegality of status for the person who is trafficked: they may be protected from expulsion, but not necessarily granted legal residence. It can also mean that legal status is not just relying on rights, entry, residence, and country of origin, but rather on the progress and discretion of individual criminal investigations. 

Third the role of ‘rights’ orientations in shaping the emergence of a coherent policy field is in the consistent rights reduction for those seeking asylum on the territory of the EU. The Union has extended the list of ‘safe’ third countries (a single list for all EU member states); common minimum procedures for deportation (including rights of redress and for procedural fairness), but has had no comment (as far as we are aware) on the long-term incarceration of children and adults seeking asylum (e.g. UK), the squalid informal camps where asylum seekers reside (e.g. Italy), and indeed shifting responsibility for asylum seekers (and promoting their incarceration) to near neighbours, such as the Ukraine. Boswell (2003; 2008) has argued that migration policy has been articulated as part of a rights-based perspective, in contrast to the security orientations which dominate the lead Directorate in the Commission (DG Freedom Security and Justice), but Kostakopoulou (2000) offers a more sceptical view. Arguments regarding the need to address the ‘root causes’ of migration and asylum seeking could have been less about a development-centred, rights-oriented perspective than about the reduction of access to asylum in the Union during rapid increases in flows in the early 1990s. Later, policy has been refined to look more like conventional security-oriented external governance (Lavenex 2006): highly conditionalised funds available to a limited number of countries, who are asked to police their borders neighbouring the EU de jure or de facto in the wider framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

In this instance, asylum policy has been treated rather separately from other aspects of the rights and equality discourse: it has in general been marked by the political tendency to propose and intensify ‘containment’ rather than guarantees of rights. Migration policy is assembled using elements from a selective and paradoxically highly conditional rights interpretation according to a logic of security-as-exclusion, closely intersecting with the security narrative which will be discussed next. What has been extended and re-affirmed, however, is the special treatment accorded to refugees. If an asylum seeker is lucky enough to be granted refugee status​[2]​ they are usually able to access social and political rights on better terms than other third country nationals (with special supports, priority housing language courses and labour market training for example). This is now also reflected in EU migration governance with a) its affirmation of refugees as possessing special rights, above those of long-term resident third country nationals, and b) the institution of a new refugee fund, to assist the social integration and settlement of refugees in the Union. In this context, we can observe how a variety of policy narratives about rights – limited rights extension, conditional protection and rights reduction – can coincide in the practical categorisation of rightful refugees.

The securities and risks narrative
The second discourse largely discussed in the literature is a security agenda. Securitisation has rightly been seen as a de-politicising orientation, which takes policymaking into the realm of national security, the exigencies of protecting ‘national interests’, and also into the hands of professional security specialists, from border guards to intelligence agencies (Huysmans 2000).

We discern three distinct narratives of security discourse in relation to migration: criminal justice, public order and national security. We take on board Neal’s (2009) arguments that the process of de-politicisation is less one of exigency and crisis and rather more one of routinisation and regularisation of professional practice and ‘risk’ management. We find this most clearly in the first aspect of security orientations – that of criminal justice, concerned with cross-border crime and border definition/management. This has sometimes elided uneasily with questions of defining entry rights, particularly concerning questions of over-stay and deportation. Here the professionals involved are the police; they are not only imbricated in the complexity of EU and national frameworks, but forms of co-operation via Europol, or Interpol , and face a variety of legal and professional constraints on their cross-border practice (e.g. protection of privacy and protection of data protection). Criminal justice is assembled as an element of migration policy intersected with rights of ‘crime victims’, usually victims of human trafficking as discussed above. These semi-legitimised ‘illegal’ migrants are then constituted and categorised in contra-distinction from visa overstayers, unsuccessful asylum seekers and undocumented migrants more generally, in order to make cross-narrative tensions between rights and security coherent.

In addition, other policy actors, notably employers employing non-EU citizens without visas are brought into the assemblage of migration governance and thus are made protagonists of the security narrative. Employers are to be active and are responsibilised as governors of ‘illegal migration’.​[3]​ Thus the distinction legal/illegal, and attempts to harden this distinction in the 2000-05 period can be seen as a way of clarifying the migration policy terrain on which criminal justice system and other ‘security’ professionals operate. 

The second element of security orientation is closely linked to that of more general criminal justice concerns, that of public order. Here we find migration governance in the EU linked to concerns about social cohesion. Public order securitisation is used to contain the temporary cross-border movement of football fans, political protesters and elected politicians (see UK’s refusal of entry to right-wing Dutch MP), and are generally directed at individuals rather than categories or groups of migrant. But it can also take on powerful racist overtones, for example with the expulsion of Roumanian Roma from Italy, and be linked to the even higher order of national security in the case of politico-religious preachers, particularly Islamic ones (see below). Questions of public order do fall into the category of de-politicising exigency; the threat to public order can be articulated with national security, but also with concerns about (risks to) social integration and cohesion or to public health (‘health’ has become a condition for migrant’s legal entry in many directives). It is vital to note however, that threats to public order, and the protection of public order, are national in scope, not European. A recent communication from the Commission attempted to regulate and limit the broad ways in which member states have been interpreting the permissible exceptions to granting LTR status to TCNs. It particularly referred to the overuse of national security and public order restrictions. In assembling its coherent ‘migration policy’, the Commission is attempting to establish political and legal limits on member state action, but is clearly very limited in its capacity to do so.

The third meaning attached to the security narrative concerns national security. Here we expect, in the context of international terrorism, the prevalence of powerful ‘belief patterns’ around (constructed) threats posed by migration supposedly sustain these concerns (Albrecht 2002). Yet the role played by ‘security’ discourse in EU governance, and how it plays out between the Commission, the Council and the member states is rather less straightforward than is sometimes assumed. First, there are rather strong limit conditions to the pursuit of a ‘securitised’ agenda even in conditions favourable to such an agenda. Boswell argues effectively that despite the notional crisis conditions applying in 2001, and later after the bombings in Madrid and London, the ‘European’ (Council and Commission, as well as other actors) responses were muted; no strong restraints on rights or even national security-oriented rhetoric emerged  (Boswell 2007).  Political/policy debate about such securitised elements is currently in abeyance in the construction of the new EU ‘migration policy’, but these elements remain available both as a policy discourse underpinning many particular measures, but also as a resource for inscription on other narratives: as with the public health test, we can find examples of security becoming a interfering factor in the other narratives.

The economic needs discourse
Not accidentally in the period when the Lisbon strategy was being drafted, the Commission elaborated on an economically driven policy narrative – encompassing both in a general and a more specific needs logic – and addressed links to the European Employment Strategy (EES) (CEC 2000, 2003). Given our interest in discursive contradictions and tensions, it suggested a ‘coherent approach’ – or  ‘intertextuality’ – between economic, social and migration policies. In an economic needs interpretation of migration policies the Commission acknowledged that the economic and demographic prospect of the Union as well as of countries of origin make ‘zero’ immigration policies inappropriate. Thus, the Commission offered a comprehensive redefinition of the migration agenda, examining the “role of immigration in relation to Lisbon objectives” (CEC 2003: 4). 
In the sense of general economic needs migration was believed to “increase labour supply and helps cope with bottlenecks”; the promotion of migrant employment thus framed as desirable for national economies and EU growth more generally, as well as for the integration of TCNs (ibid: 10). A directive proposal for a common admission scheme for TCN workers first emerged in 2001. While this proposal was dismissed by a sovereignty-concerned Council, the Commission published the policy plan on legal migration and the green paper on an EU approach to managing economic migration in 2005. This marked the explicit linking of the economised Lisbon Agenda post-2005 (Carmel 2005) with the management of legal labour migration for the purposes of promoting economic growth and managing welfare state pressures (CEU 2005).

There has been agreement that the trajectory towards EU market-making and free movement of workers has been constrained by sovereignty and protectionist resistance by the Council as a whole (Caviedes 2004; Baldaccini and Toner 2007) or individual (groups of) member states (Menz 2009; Schierup, Hansen et al. 2006). 
Since member states did not accept the broad approach to labour needs of the 2001 directive proposal, the Commission took a more selective approach to governing entry in the post-Hague period. Instead of generally defining entry criteria, it now sets out to address specific categories of workers in a much more specific needs definition. Both the directive proposal and the green paper embraced a more selective circumvention of the predominant security-orientation in case of economic need and labour market shortages. The approval in summer 2009 of the EU Blue Card proposal for highly skilled workers (CEC 2007a), and the proposed regulations for seasonal workers, remunerated trainees and intra-corporate transferees are additional evidence for this view. The Commission also refined its proposal for a common admission scheme for TCN workers (CEC 2007b). Moreover, a general principle of admission is seen in "the existence of a work contract" and the "economic needs test" (CEC 2005b). This means that national labour supply and labour market situation are considered first, before labour migration becomes a tool of generating economic growth.

Institutionally, the economisation is a development that might not only selectively swing open ‘fortress Europe’s’ largely domestically controlled doors in case of workforce requirements (cf. van Houtum and Pijpers 2007), but it may also lead to a reconsideration of cooperation in the area of labour migration admission schemes. Neither of these should surprise us given the market-making dynamic which is so fundamental to the Union (Favell and Hansen 2002). Despite the being unable to agree on most of these proposals, the Council continues to insist on the priority of migration management particularly to regulate selective labour migration according to required skills with explicit reference to the Lisbon targets for growth and employment (CEU 2008b: 9). 

The social integration discourse
A striking feature of policy proposals, programmes – and even monies – in the EU from the mid-2000s onwards has been the increasing centrality of ‘social integration’ as a key discursive figure in the assemblage of EU migration governance. , to which particular migration narrative from a range of discourses can link in an apparently coherent way.

The Lisbon Agenda between 2000 and 2005 included the aim of generating ‘greater social cohesion’ in the EU. Initially, migrants were discussed among those social groups less likely to have access to social resources and employment, and more likely to face social exclusion and disadvantage. However, there were no resources or institutional space for consideration of migrants needs in the EU. Migrants appeared in lists of ‘the excluded’ or the ‘most marginalised’, along with ‘young people’, ‘women’, ‘the long-term unemployed’ and notionally equivalent others. But specifically these vulnerable migrant groups like visa-overstayers or undocumented migrants were also most likely to be the object of the punitive criminal justice mechanisms. Even if this agenda also concerned LTRs who might have worse employment prospects than migrants from EU-nations, social integration has ignored the especially vulnerable legal situation (precarious or illegitimate legal status) and social position of undocumented migrants.​[4]​ Indeed, even in 2005, the focus was not on integration of migrants but on creating ‘circular migration’, offering highly conditional ‘rights’ of limited return for migrants from co-operating countries.
From 2004 we see a major shift, as the centre of gravity of EU migration governance begins to move from securitised rights to the assembly of elements around the node of economic development, social integration and managed exclusion. The investigations into the attacks in the US, the bombings in Madrid and London, and intensification in the competition for highly-skilled labour, combined with the end of the transition period in policymaking after Amsterdam had the joint effects of promoting a particular kind of ‘social integration’ as a key element in (coherent) EU migration governance. In assembling ‘coherent migration policy’ social integration performs the purpose of discursively imparting to the EU a solidity, coherence and comprehensibility which does not reflect the variable practices of member states nor experiences of migrants themselves. The underpinning notion of homogeneity that is part of many integration approaches (wrongly) depicts the Union as a unified, bounded and comprehensible entity.





EU migration governance constructed as ‘migration policy’ with specified ‘tools and actions’ is currently constituted as an eminently governable – and eminently ‘European’ – terrain. We have seen how the rights and equality narrative with its immanent distinctions creates several categories of statuses and conditions for migrants. The rights discourse, sometimes perceived as evidence of the EU’s liberal heritage, is articulated with narratives of security and order, including the definitions of legality and ‘illegality’ so central to migration ‘management’. Recently, the agenda has been primarily concerned with migration as a means to promote economic growth in coherence with the EU as a market-making institution, but it also demonstrates the ambiguous but apparently unimpeachable credentials of the European Social Model through its emphasis on social integration. 

By a re-definition and extension of the terrain of ‘migration policies’ the EU now incorporates economic and social cohesion objectives into the framework of sense-making. Trying to fit together market-making, social cohesion and the border-drawing practices, new categories of rights (i.e. for high-skilled workers) but also new limitations due to perceived security risks (i.e. threats to public order) have emerged. This assemblage of the governable terrain of ‘migration’ as ‘migration policy’, disguises the normalisation and routinisation of traditional security–dominated elements of migration governance such as control, exclusion and expulsion. That they are routinised, and under-debated should not blind us to the role of this persisting narrative. They continue to shape key elements of EU migration governance, and therewith also member states’ policies.
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^1	  Abbreviations used: CEC = Commission of the European Communities, CEU = Council of the European Union
^2	  These chances are exceptionally small: in many member states, fewer than 5% of asylum seekers are granted refugee status.
^3	  The linguistic elision here is no accident: migrants become ‘illegal’ by undertaking work for which they do not have a visa, while employers act illegally when employing workers who do not have the ‘right’ papers. ‘Illegal work’ and ‘illegal migration’ are not merely articulated together, they are somehow melded together in a single condition jointly constituted from their migration and employment statuses which renders both employer and employee ‘illegal’. (See EU regulation on the responsibilities of employers)
^4	  E.g.. subject to exclusion from social services and benefits; exploitation in employment, housing without recourse to redress; subject to racist and xenophobic violence and exploitation without recourse to justice system
